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 ABSTRACT 
 
There have been different degrees of exchange rate disequilibrium in the developing countries 
during transition or reform periods. The level of the exchange rate and its misalignment can have 
significant impacts on agricultural policy measures such as Producer Support Estimates (PSEs). 
In the conventional PSE analysis, however, the actual (nominal) exchange rates are used. There 
is general agreement that the use of actual exchange rates may introduce a bias in the PSE 
calculations, and that this bias can be substantial in some cases. But there is less agreement on 
the most appropriate alternative.  
 
In this study, we utilize various time series techniques to derive estimates of the equilibrium 
exchange rates in India and China as determined by real economic fundamentals from the 1950s 
to the 2000s. The relevance and usefulness of the equilibrium exchange rates in the calculation of 
PSE for the two countries are then discussed. Drawing on the data sets and analyses developed 
earlier by Mullen, Orden and Gulati (2005) and Sun (2003), we find that agricultural support 
levels measured by the PSEs (from 1985-2002 for India and from 1995-2001 for China) are 
sensitive to alternative exchange rate assumptions. Specifically, exchange rate misalignments 
have either amplified or counteracted the direct effects from sectoral-specific policies. In India, 
such indirect effects are relatively small and mostly dominated by the direct effects. But in 
China, especially in recent years, the indirect effect from exchange rate misalignment 
(undervaluation) has been quite substantial.  
 
Results from this study also show that the effect of the exchange rate depends on the relative 
importance of different PSE components. The increasing share of budgetary expenditures in 
India’s total agricultural support in recent years has resulted in more pronounced exchange rate 
effects measured by commodity-specific percentage “PSEs” that use the value of production at 
international prices as the denominator compared to those measured by commodity-specific 
percentage Market Price Support (MPS) with the same denominator. For China, the exchange 
rate effects are more similar between the PSE and the MPS measures because budgetary 
expenditures have been relatively small.  
 
The exchange rate effect when the PSE is “scaled up” from covered commodities to an estimate 
for the total agricultural sector is also demonstrated. Since the commodity coverage in both 
countries tends to be incomplete and the scaling-up procedure leads to a total MPS of greater 
magnitude, larger exchange rate effects are found in the scaled-up than the non-scaled-up version 
of total PSEs. The impact of scaling-up on the indirect effect is proportional to the share of 
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1. Introduction 
Agricultural policies in the developing countries play a very important role in determining 
domestic commodity prices and the returns to agriculture. The nature and degree of the policy 
interventions differ across countries thereby producing different types of impact on producers 
and consumers. Various agricultural policy indicators (APIs) such as the Producer Support 
Estimates (PSEs) have been constructed to evaluate and monitor these policy changes (Josling 
and Valdes, 2004). A problem with conventional analyses based on the APIs, however, is that 
they usually have a sector-specific focus that can miss the important linkages between economy-
wide policies and the agricultural sector. By changing the relative prices of importables, 
exportables, and home goods, some economy-wide policies, such as the exchange rate policies, 
can have impacts on agricultural incentives that might overwhelm those from sectoral policies. 
The different effects of sectoral and economy-wide policies on agriculture in the developing 
countries were documented in a classic series of studies by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988 and 
1991). 
 
The relevance of exchange rates in the PSE estimates has been pointed out by a number of 
authors including Harley (1996), Bojnec and Swinnen (1997), and Melyukhina (2002). This 
issue is particularly important for the developing countries since capital surges, macroeconomic 
instability and subsequent financial crisis in the last two decades, together with delayed or 
insufficient adjustments in the exchange rates, have generated substantial exchange rate 
misalignments in some of these countries. Pronounced misalignments in the exchange rate could 
potentially subsidize or tax the agricultural sector and lead to incorrect estimates of the level and 
sometimes the direction of agricultural support as measured by the PSE. In these cases, the 
effects of exchange rate misalignments have to be taken into account if meaningful calculations 
of the PSE are to be presented.  
 
While there is general agreement that the use of misaligned exchange rates introduces a bias in 
the PSE calculations and that this bias can be substantial in some cases, there is much less 
agreement on the most appropriate alternative. The problem arises from the fact that it is 
fundamentally difficult to determine the equilibrium value of an exchange rate. A number of 
previous studies (e.g. Liefert, et al., 1996; Shick, 2002) have used effective exchange rates or 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates as the “equilibrium” exchange rates in their PSE 
calculations, and the findings from these studies generally indicate that alternative assumptions 
about exchange rates have significant impacts on the PSEs. Despite their plausible results, the 
calculations based on the PPP involve a high degree of discretion and the results are usually 
sensitive to the selection of a base year. Other models of equilibrium exchange rates are 
potentially preferred to the PPP approach in the PSE estimations (Harley, 1996).  
 
More recently, the real equilibrium approach that relates the real exchange rate with economic 
fundamentals has gained prominence and been frequently used by both practitioners and policy 
makers to address issues of exchange rate misalignment and to test for over- or under-valued 
  1currencies. The current study attempts to use the real equilibrium approach of exchange rate 
determination and identify the relevance and usefulness of the equilibrium exchange rate in the 
PSE calculations. We focus our analysis on two world’s largest developing economies, India and 
China, where issues of exchange rate misalignment and the effects on the agricultural support 
have been important but nonetheless received little attention.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 empirically estimates the equilibrium exchange 
rates of India and China. Results in Section 2 are then applied to the MPS and PSE calculations 
in section 3. Summary and conclusions are provided in section 4. 
 
2. Equilibrium Exchange Rate: India and China  
To address the effects of exchange rate misalignments on agriculture support levels measured by 
the PSE, the first task is to establish the exchange rate equilibrium. There is no simple answer to 
what determined the equilibrium exchange rate, and estimating equilibrium exchange rates and 
the degree of exchange rate misalignment remains one of the most challenging empirical 
problems in open-economy macroeconomics (Williamson, 1994). The fundamental difficulty is 
that the equilibrium value of the exchange rate is not observable while the exchange rate 
misalignment refers to a situation in which a country’s actual exchange rate deviates from such 
an unobservable equilibrium. The issue is further complicated by the fact that there exist a 
variety of models to determine the equilibrium exchange rates.
1
 
One strand of the empirical literature that originates from the real equilibrium model have gained 
prominence over the past decade and been frequently used in research and policy to address 
issues of exchange rate equilibrium and misalignment. Equilibrium exchange rates in this model 
are derived from a theoretical framework that maximizes representative agent’s intertemporal 
utility subject to budget constraints (Agenor, 1998; Hinkle and Montiel, 1999). The reduced form 
solution of the model relates the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate to a set of steady-state 
values of supply-side, demand-side and policy variables (real economic fundamentals).
2  Since 
the early applications by Edwards (1989), a number of authors have used such approach to model 
exchange rates in the developing countries, e.g., Elbadawi, 1994; Elbadawi and Soto, 1994 and 
1997; Mongardini, 1998; Baffes, Elbadawi and O’Connell, 1999; Rahman and Basher, 2001; 
Paiva, 2001; Zhang, 2001; Zhang, 2002; Cerra and Saxena, 2002; Mathisen, 2003 and Cady, 
2003. These studies differ primarily by their selection of fundamentals and econometric methods.  
 
This paper adopts the “reduced-form” real equilibrium approach where the real exchange rate is 
determined by the economic fundamentals. The set of fundamentals that may be identified (by 
theory) typically includes the following four categories: (1) Domestic supply-side factors and 
particularly the Balassa–Samuelson effect arising from faster productivity growth in the tradable 
good sector relative to the non-tradable good sector; (2) Fiscal policy, such as fiscal deficits as 
well as changes in the composition of government spending between tradable and non-tradable 
                                                 
1 Commonly used approaches range from the simple Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) to more sophisticated models 
such as the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) (Williamson, 1994), the Natural Real Exchange Rate 
(NATREX) (Stein, 1994), the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) (Clark and MacDonald, 1999), etc. 
2 The BEER is similar to the specification of the real equilibrium model. But the theoretical underpinning for the 
BEER is the simple uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition, adjusted for the existence of a time varying risk 
premium (Clark and MacDonald, 1999). 
  2goods; (3) International economic environment, including capital inflows, external transfers, and 
terms of trade; (4) Commercial policy such as trade liberalization in terms of a reduction in 
import tariffs and export subsidies. See Hinkle and Montiel (1999) for a discussion of the 
analytical model.  
          
Given the nature of the underlying data series, the empirical analysis closely follows the 
contemporary non-stationary time-series modeling paradigm. First, the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests are applied to the univariate data series to establish their temporal properties. 
Second, a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is specified and the Johansen cointegration 
method is used to determine if one or more long-run relationships exist among the system of 
variables. Third, structural hypothesis tests involving restrictions on cointegration coefficients as 
well as weak exogeneity are performed on the realized long-run relationships to determine 
uniquely the cointegrating vectors. Fourth, considering that the current values of the economic 
fundamentals themselves may not be at their long-run equilibrium level, the Hodrick-Prescott 
(H-P) filtering method is used to estimate long-run or permanent component of the fundamentals 
by removing the cyclical component from the data.
3 Finally, the estimated cointegrating vector 
along with the permanent component of the economic fundamentals are used to calculate the 
equilibrium real exchange rates and gauge the corresponding misalignments.  
 
Data Description 
The sample period covers 1950-2003 for India and 1952-2002 for China, using annual data 
drawn from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. A system of variables,  , 
consisting of the real exchange rate and the underlying fundamentals, is formulated for each 
country with their constructions and composing data summarized in Table 1. Note that both the 
sample sizes and the choice of variables are dictated by data availability. All variables are in 
logarithmic forms except the interest rate. 
t x
 
The real exchange rate (LRER) is defined as the product of nominal exchange rate and the ratio 
of the consumer price indexes (CPI). While some other studies have focused on the real effective 
exchange rate, the real exchange rate defined here is a bilateral rate expressed in terms of 
domestic currencies per foreign currency (in this case the US dollar), so that an increase 
represents depreciation. The Balassa-Samuelson effect caused by differential productivity growth 
in the traded good vs. non-traded good sectors is approximated by the productivity change 
variable (LPRO). Consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson theory, an increase in the productivity 
in the tradable sector relative to the non-tradable sector appreciates the exchange rate, because it 
creates excess demand in the non-tradable sector. This variable is proxied by the log of annual 
growth of the industrial production index for India and the gross fixed capital formation for 
China (Cerra and Saxena, 2002; Zhang, 2001). The government expenditure variable (LGEX) as 
a percentage to the GDP is used to capture the effect of fiscal policies. Changes in the 
composition of government consumption affect the exchange rate in different ways, depending 
on whether the consumption is directed toward traded or non-traded goods. If an increase in 
government consumption is concentrated in non-traded goods, excess demand in this sector will 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, a moving average, a Beveridge-Nelson or a Gonzalo-Granger technique can be used to extract 
permanent component from the fundaments (e.g. Elbadawi and Soto, 1997; Baffes, Elbadawi and O’Connell, 1999; 
Clark and MacDonald, 2000; Cerra and Saxena, 2002; and Mathisen, 2003). 
  3  4
lead to higher non-traded good price and thus real exchange rate appreciation. The opposite will 
happen if the government consumption is concentrated in traded goods.  
 
Table 1: Variable Construction and Data Description  
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Description of data 
e  Nominal exchange rate 
GEX  Government expenditure 
NIR  Nominal interest rate 
XUV  Export unit value (Index, 2000=100) 
MUV  Import unit value (Index, 2000=100) 
VX  Value of exports 
VM  Value of imports 
FCF  Fixed capital formation 
CPI  Consumer price index (2000=100) 
IPI  Industrial production index (2000=100) 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
Note: 1) * denotes foreign variables.  
          2) Variables LPRO and LTOT are constructed differently for India and China due to data constraints. 
          3) The data frequency is annual. 
Source: IMF, IFS, various years.  
 
To capture the change in international economic environment, the real world interest rate (WIR) 
is used, which is approximated by the US real interest rate calculated by subtracting the 1-year 
Treasury-Bill rate by the US inflation rate (percent change in the US CPI).  It is widely accepted 
that the world interest rate interacts with capital flows into and out of the developing countries. A 
stylized effect associated with a reduction in the world interest rate and thus capital inflows is 
real exchange rate appreciations. However, Agenor (1998) and Hinkle and Montiel (1999) show   5
that the real exchange rate appreciation in the developing countries, following capital surges as a 
result of lower world interest rate, is only a temporary phenomenon, and in the long-run the real 
exchange rate tends to depreciate. The terms of trade (LTOT) is defined as the ratio of export 
price index to import price index for India. However, no consistent export and import price data 
are available for China and this variable is proxied instead by its export growth (one-lag 
difference of the log of exports) (Zhang, 2001). Early studies (e.g. Elbadawi and Soto, 1994) 
have shown that the effect of terms of trade is ambiguous. An improvement in the terms of trade 
increases national income which in turn increases demand for non-traded good leading to real 
exchange rate appreciation (an income effect). On the other hand, the improvement of terms of 
trade lowers the cost of imported inputs in the production of non-traded goods causing real 
exchange rate depreciation (a substitution effect). The openness (LOPN) is calculated as the ratio 
of the sum of imports plus exports to the GDP. Its use as a proxy for commercial policy is 
justified because of the difficulty of obtaining good time series data on import tariff and export 
subsidy and also because it may account not only for explicit commercial policy but also for 
implicit, though very important, factors such as quotas and exchange controls (Elbadawi and 
Soto, 1994).  
 
UThe Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
Unit root and cointegration tests are conducted for the system of variables identified earlier. The 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests (Table 2) show that the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
accepted for all variables in levels except LPRO for India and LTOT for China, which seem to be 
trend stationary.TP
4
PT The Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are also provided and they generally confirm the 
ADF test results. All series are then first differenced and the ADF and PP tests are re-conducted. 
For each series, both test statistics rose considerably, and the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
rejected at the 1 percent or 5 percent significance levels. It is thus concluded that all the variables 
in  t x  are I(1) in levels and I(0) in differences. 
 
If each series is an I(1) process, common tests for the possibility of an equilibrium are the 
Johansen maximum likelihood method (Johansen, 1991). The Johansen test in this analysis starts 
with a specification of an unrestricted Vector Autoregressive model of order p (VAR(p)) which 
starts from a relatively small number of lags for each of the endogenous variables to economize 
the degrees of freedom:  
11 2 2... tt t p t p t −− − =+ Α+ + + + xA x ∆xA x αε  
where  t x  is a (1 ) n×  vector of non-stationary I(1) variables,  i A  is a () nn ×  coefficient matrix, α 
is a (1 ) n×  intercept vector and  t ε  is vector of error terms.TP
5
PT The lag lengths of 2 and 1 are 
selected for India and China respectively based on a series of model diagnostic tests including 
the F-tests, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), 
and the Jarque-Bera and Ljung-Box tests for residuals (details are provided in Cheng, 2005).  
 
                                                 
TP
4
PT The rejection of a unit root may result from small lag lengths, which adversely affect the size of the ADF and PP 
tests. When additional lags are included, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for these variables.    
TP
5
PT A vector of dummy variables is included in the VAR to take account of short-run shocks to the system. This vector 
contains three dummy variables for India representing two oil price shocks in the 1970s and the balance of payment 
crisis in the early 1990s, and three dummy variables for China representing the great famine during 1960-63 and two 
major exchange rate policy interventions in the early 1980s and mid 1990s.    6
Table 2: The Unit Root Test Results 
Test Statistics  Country 
Variable  τ   ) (τ Z   µ τ   ) ( µ τ Z   τ τ  ) ( τ τ Z  
India Levels 
LRER  1.32 1.61 -0.30 -0.20  -2.15  -1.89
 













P  -2.13 -2.48  -2.27  -2.54
 
WIR  -0.70 -0.76 -1.64  -1.82  -1.07  -1.22 
LTOT  -0.10 -0.55 -3.27P
*
P  -2.77 -3.55P
*
P  -2.83 
LOPN  -0.60 -0.84 -0.26  -0.41  -2.38  -1.74 
















































































LRER  1.57 1.96 -0.29 -0.03  -2.32  -2.30 
LPRO  -1.30 -2.30
  -1.38 -2.34 -3.64P
*
P  -3.15 
LGEX  -1.33 -1.96 -1.16  -0.91  -2.43  -2.50 


















P  0.20 0.92 -1.95
  -2.06 















































































Note: 1) **1% significance level, *5% significance level. Critical values are from MacKinnon (1991) 
          2) The test statistics τ ,  µ τ ,  τ τ  and  ) (τ Z , ) ( µ τ Z , ) ( τ τ Z  are ADF and PP tests respectively and correspond to 
three type of specifications: (i) no trend and no intercept; (ii) intercept only; and (iii) trend and intercept. 
          3) The lag length p of the ADF test is set by the AIC + 1 in every case. The PP test is based on Newey-West 
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The Johansen test is conducted based on a VECM of the form: 













=− ∑ Ψ A  are () nn ×  coefficient matrices. Alternatively, Ψ can be 
written as  ′ = Ψ AB , for A an () nh ×  matrix (adjustment coefficients) and  ′ B  an () hn ×  matrix 
(cointegrating relationships). Table 3 shows the test results based sequentially on two model 
specifications with and without a deterministic trend in the data. At 5 percent significance level, 
the null hypothesis that  0 = h  and  1 ≤ h  are rejected for India. However, the null hypothesis that 
the cointegrating rank is at most 2 is accepted. Hence, there is evidence that there are two 
cointegrating relationships among the variables ( 2 h = ). For China,  0 = h  is rejected and the 
cointegrating rank of at most 1 is accepted, so there is evidence of only one cointegrating 
relationship among the variables ( 1 h = ).  
 
Table 3: The Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Null 
Hypothesis  No deterministic trend in levels (I)    Deterministic trend in levels (II) 
 
trace λ  
test 
trace λ  
(0.95) 
max λ  
test 
max λ  
(0.95) 
 
trace λ  
test 
trace λ  
(0.95) 
max λ  
test 
max λ  
(0.95) 
India  VEC(2) with dummies 
0 = h   151.55P
*
P  103.85  68.56P
*
P  40.96    147.86P
*
P  95.75 68.26P
*
P  40.08 
1 ≤ h   82.99P
*
P  76.97  38.82P
*
P  34.81    79.61P
*
P  69.82 38.32P
*
P  33.88 
2 ≤ h   44.18 54.08 20.60 28.59    41.29 47.86 20.60 27.58 
3 ≤ h   23.58 35.19 10.65 22.30    20.69 29.80 10.60 21.13 
4 ≤ h   12.92 20.26 9.60 15.89    10.09 15.49 9.23 14.26 
5 ≤ h   3.33 9.16 3.33 9.16    0.87 3.84 0.87 3.84 
                  
China  VEC(1) with dummies 
0 = h   119.04P
*
P  103.85 46.81P
*
P  40.96    108.43P
*
P  95.75 45.59P
*
P  40.08 
1 ≤ h   72.23 76.97 33.32  34.81    62.84 69.82 32.74 33.88 
2 ≤ h   38.91 54.08 14.26  28.59    30.10 47.86 13.77 27.58 
3 ≤ h   24.65 35.19 12.60  22.30    16.33 29.80 9.98 21.13 
4 ≤ h   12.05 20.26 9.20 15.89    6.35 15.49 5.92 14.26 
5 ≤ h   2.85 9.16 2.85  9.16    0.42 3.84 0.42 3.84 
Note: 1) Case I: no intercept in the cointegrating equation or the VEC; Case II: intercept in the cointegrating 
equation and the VEC   
          2) h is the cointegrating rank.  
          3) * denotes rejection at 5% significance level. 
           
UThe Structural Hypothesis Tests 
A likelihood ratio (LR) test developed by Johansen and Juselius (1990) is used to test for 
restrictions on B and A individually and jointly. The restrictions in the long-run cointegrating 
relationships and the adjustment parameters are incorporated into the eigenvalue problem 
corresponding to each of the hypothesis to be tested. The LR test of the hypothesis is given by:   8
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The test statistic is compared with a 
2 χ  distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of parameter restrictions.  
 
The test on B can be formulated as:  ( ) 11 22 : , ,..., hh H ϕ ϕϕ B B= H H H , where  i H  is a () i ns ×  
restriction matrix and  i ϕ  is a ( ) 1 i s ×  vector of parameters to be estimated in the ith cointegrating 
relation ( 1,..., ih = ). In this formulation, there are  i s  unrestricted parameters in the ith vector in 
B and  i H  imposes  i k  restrictions ( ii ksn + = ). While common restrictions placed on the 
cointegrating vectors include the exclusion and proportionality restrictions, we only consider the 
exclusion restrictions in this analysis. The restriction matrix H  is constructed based on the 
following restrictions:  
0 ij = B ,  1,...,6 i = ,  1, 2 j =  (India) 
1 0 i = B ,  1,...,6 i =  (China) 
The null hypotheses in each test and the LR test statistics are presented in Table 4. The test 
statistics are compared with a 
2[( ) ] rn s χ −  distribution (i.e., 
2[2(6 5)] χ −  for India and 
2[1(6 5)] χ −  for China).  
 
Table 4: Exclusion Restrictions on B 
 India    China 
Variable  Null Hypothesis  LR Statistic    Null Hypothesis  LR Statistic 
LRER  11 12 0 == BB   25.30P
*
P    11 0 = B   4.21P
* 
LPRO  21 22 0 == BB   28.84P
*
P    21 0 = B   0.04 
LGEX  31 32 0 == BB   23.24P
*
P    31 0 = B   5.41P
*
P 
WIR  41 42 0 == BB   20.56P
*
P    41 0 = B   5.49P
*
P 
LTOT  51 52 0 == BB   43.92P
*
P    51 0 = B   7.41P
*
P 
LOPN  61 62 0 == BB   14.31P
*
P    61 0 = B   4.09P
*
P 
Note:  1) * denote rejection at the 5% significance level. 
           2) 
2(2) 5.99 χ =  and 
2(1) 3.84 χ =  at 5% significance level. 
 
All the null hypotheses of zero coefficients in the cointegrating vectors (B) are rejected for India, 
indicating that the real exchange rate and each of the fundamentals are relevant for the respective 
long-run relationships identified earlier. However, we fail to reject the null hypotheses that 
LPRO can be excluded from the long-run relationship for China.  
 
The rejections of the null hypotheses relating to the long-run cointegrating coefficients in B for 
India warrant further attention. Since there are two cointegrating vectors for India and the above 
structural hypothesis tests on B are joint tests for coefficients in both vectors, rejection of the null 
hypothesis might indicate that each of the two cointegrating vectors represents a distinct   9
relationship in the cointegration space. To identify uniquely the equilibrium exchange rate 
relationship, we proceed by partitioning the system of variables into two “blocks” (the internal 
block: LPRO and LGEX; and the external block: LRER, WIR, LTOT and LOPN) and test the 
exclusion of both blocks in each cointegrating vector with the other unrestricted. The LR test 
statistic, distributed as 
2 χ , indicates that at 5% significance level neither block can be excluded 
from the first cointegrating vector (with the second unrestricted). However, we fail to reject the 
exclusion of the “internal block” with 
2(1) 2.40 χ = , and reject the exclusion of the “external 
block” with 
2(3) 21.71 χ =  in the second cointegrating vector (with the first unrestricted). See 
Cheng (2005) for details. 
 
To further investigate the model formation, a zero restriction on the adjustment parameters (A) 
or the weak exogeneity test is performed. The test on A can be formulated as: 
:  HA A=K A %  
where K is a ( ) ns ×  matrix, A %  is an ( ) sh ×  matrix of non-zero A-coefficients with sh ≥ . The 
restriction matrix, K, is constructed based on the restrictions:  
0 ij = A ,  1,...,6 i = ,  1, 2 j =  (India) 
1 0 i = A ,  1,...,6 i =  (China) 
The null hypotheses in each test and the test statistics are presented in Table 5. The test statistics 
are compared with a 
2 χ  distribution with the same degrees of freedom as the tests on B.  
 
Table 5: Weak Exogeneity Tests on A 
 India    China 
Variable  Null Hypothesis  LR Statistic    Null Hypothesis  LR Statistic 
LRER  11 12 0 == AA   25.48P
*
P    11 0 = A   6.16* 
LPRO  21 22 0 == AA   16.92P
*
P    21 0 = A   0.01 
LGEX  31 32 0 == AA   7.07P
*
P    31 0 = A   3.69
 
WIR  41 42 0 == AA   1.94
    41 0 = A   0.004 
LTOT  51 52 0 == AA   9.37P
*
P    51 0 = A   1.31
 
LOPN  61 62 0 == AA   13.57P
*
P    61 0 = A   4.04P
*
P 
Note:  1) * denotes rejection at the 5% significance level. 
           2) 
2(2) 5.99 χ =  and 
2(1) 3.84 χ =  at 5% significance level. 
 
The null hypothesis of weak exogeneity of WIR cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level 
for India, while four variables (LPRO, LGEX, WIR and LTOT) are found to be weakly exogenous 
for China. A joint test of weak exogeneity for all four variables is also accepted with 
2(4) 6.47 χ = (p-value 0.17 = ). Thus LPRO, LGEX, WIR, and LTOT are concluded to be jointly 
weakly exogenous.  
   10
Combining all the information presented above, we pool the hypotheses HB  and HA and test the 
restrictions on B and A jointly ( & :  HH H ∩ BA B A ). The restricted B and A for India and China 




⎡⎤ ′ = ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
B  and 
***0**
***0**
⎡ ⎤ ′ = ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
A   
China:  [ ] *0**** ′ = B  and  [ ] *0000* ′= A  
where the restrictions are imposed jointly on B as well as A. Both joint restrictions cannot be 
rejected at 5% significance level with 
2(3) 4.44 χ =  (p-value 0.22 = ) and
2(5) 6.47 χ =  
(p-value 0.26 = ) for India and China respectively. On the basis of these results, Table 6 presents 
the restricted cointegration analysis for India and China.  
 
Table 6: Restricted Cointegration Results 
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0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.042 
(0.015) 
-- 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
UEquilibrium Exchange Rates 
Based on the restricted cointegration results in Table 6, the equilibrium real exchange rates 
(LRER) in India and China are calculated based on the following cointegrating equations with 




                                                 
TP
6
PT The calculations of the equilibrium exchange rates also draw on a recent study by Cheng and Orden (2005).     11
India:
4.557 12.450 0.710 3.849 0.505 0.591
                           (1.325)             (0.077)            (1.088)        (0.182)          (0.075)
LRER LPRO LGEX WIR LTOT LOPN =− + + + +   
China:
0.179 0.000 1.855 11.735 1.913 0.769
                              (0.000)            (0.756)           (3.237)        (0.593)           (0.112)
LRER LPRO LGEX WIR LTOT LOPN =− − − + − +  
  
In general, the parameter estimates are consistent with expectations discussed earlier. The 
negative sign of the variable LPRO for India suggests that an increase in the productivity in the 
traded good sector relative to the non-traded good sector is associated with real exchange rate 
appreciation, which is consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson theory. The exclusion of LPRO in 
China’s equilibrium exchange rate relationship indicates a lack of the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
in China. This is possibly due to the fact that China’s domestic prices have been highly 
administered in the social economy setting, and the usual link between productivity and relative 
prices may be distorted leading to the break-down of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in this 
country. Similar findings are reported by Coudert and Couharde (2005), where the authors used a 
panel cointegration method based on a sample of 173 countries including China. An increase in 
the government expenditure (LGEX) causes the rupee to depreciate but the yuan to appreciate. 
The difference in the sign is due to the fact that government expenditures of India might have a 
higher content of traded good than that of China, which is consistent with Cerra and Saxena 
(2002) and Zhang (2001). The positive sign associated with WIR indicates that a reduction in the 
world interest rate depreciates the real exchange rates. This result is consistent with Agenor 
(1998) and Hinkle and Montiel (1999).  
 
As shown earlier, the effect of the terms of trade on the equilibrium exchange rates can be 
ambiguous, depending on the relative importance between the substitution effect and the income 
effect. The positive signs on LTOT for India suggest the possible dominance of the substitution 
effect over the income effect and improvements in the terms of trade depreciate its currency. The 
reverse happens in the case of China where an increase in the terms of trade leads to real 
appreciation. The volume of trade, or degree of openness, as measured by the variable LOPN is 
an importance factor in determining the level of real exchange rate. In both countries, the 
positive signs confirm the findings in the literature that economic closedness is typically 
associated with overvaluation, and external liberalization aimed at reducing tariffs and 
eliminating trade restrictions causes currency depreciations.     
 
In order to obtain the “long-run”, “steady state” or “permanent” values of the economic 
fundamentals in each country, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) decomposing technique (Hodrick and 
Prescott, 1997) is applied. The HP filter decomposes the time series into a trend  t µ   and 
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where λ  is an arbitrary constant reflecting the penalty of incorporating fluctuations into the 
trend. In this analysis, λ  is chosen to be equal to 10 to match our annual data set (see Hodrick 
and Prescott, 1997). Based on the HP filtered values of the economic fundamentals as well as the cointegrating vectors, the equilibrium exchange rate can be calculated for both countries. Figure1 
shows the equilibrium exchange rates as compared to the actual rates (reporting only 1985-
2002).  
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Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The real exchange rate of the Indian rupee is characterized by overvaluation as shown in Figure 1 
(India). The overvaluation started in 1986 and ended in 1993, two years after the financial crisis 
in 1991. In the official descriptions of the events, India’s exchange rate overvaluation and crisis 
has been attributed to continued current account deficits and reserve depletion, made worse by 
problems related to the Gulf War; and a loss of confidence in the government as political 
problems compounded the weak credibility associated with high fiscal deficits (Rangaranjan, 
1993). Such explanation is consistent with the model results, by which weak economic 
fundamentals are associated with depreciated currency, and given insufficient devaluation of the 
actual exchange rate, overvaluation occurs.  
 
The post-crisis adjustment program in India featured macroeconomic stabilization and structural 
reforms, especially in the direction of trade and financial liberalization. The effects of these 
measures were evident on the external sector. In the years after the crisis, rising capital inflows 
and shrinking trade deficits have led to continued accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. 
Large steps of devaluation in the early stage of the reform have caused the actual exchange rate 
to “overshoot” its long-run equilibrium in our model estimation, resulting in an undervaluation 
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for a number of years. In recent years, with a slight overvaluation, the rupee rate has remained 
close to its equilibrium values. 
 
In comparison to the Indian rupee, the actual real exchange rate movements of the Chinese yuan 
during the post-reform era are in general characterized by undervaluations (Figure 1 (China)). It 
is important to note that, starting from 1999, there has been a period of sustained undervaluation. 
The widening gap between the equilibrium and the actual rate in recent years has stimulated a 
heated debate on the issue of undervaluation of the Chinese yuan. The US in particular has 
expressed serious concerns on the undervaluation in face of its exploding trading deficits with 
China, which amounted to over $124 billion in 2003. A series of unfair trade practice petitions 
(“Section 301”) against China have been filed by a coalition of industry and labor groups. 
Despite the lobbying efforts from the US government along with strong supports from the IMF 
with the aim to eliminate China’s currency manipulation, the exchange rate of the Chinese 
currency remains fixed to the US dollar. The predicted degree of undervaluation in recent years 
(1999-2002) from this study averages about 20 percent which is broadly consistent with 
predictions from other recent empirical studies (see for example, Frankel, 2004; Goldstein, 2004; 
Coudert and Couharde, 2005).   
 
3. Effects of Exchange Rates on the PSE 
This section applies our model-based equilibrium exchange rate identified in the previous section 
to the PSE calculations.TP
7
PT Building on the OECD’s PSE analytical framework, and drawing on 
recent PSE studies by Mullen, Orden and Gulati (2005) and Sun (2003), we examine the effects 
of exchange rate on the MPS and PSE for India and China.  
 
UEffects on MPS 
The effects of exchange rate are directly reflected in the estimation of the MPS component of the 
PSE as an exchange rate is introduced to convert the world price into domestic currency. The 
MPS for a specific commodity (j) in monetary terms is defined as:  
()
da r
j jj j MPS P P Q =−×  
where:
           : domestic producer price of commodity j
           : adjusted reference price of commodity j 










The adjusted reference price 
ar
j P  is the world market price expressed in domestic currency and 
adjusted by various costs. The cost adjustment differs depending on whether the commodity is an 




jj j PP e A D J =× + 
                                                 
TP
7
PT The nominal equilibrium exchange rates used in the PSE calculations are derived from the corresponding real 
equilibrium rates by multiplying it with the ratio of the domestic CPI to US CPI. 
TP
8
PT Byerlee and Morris (1993) argue that the selection of a relevant reference price depends on the relationship 
between the autarky equilibrium price and the adjusted reference prices for imports and exports (see also Mullen, et 
al., 2004).   14
where:
           : world market price of commodity j
           : nominal exchange rate 









The  j MPS  in percentage terms is:  










The % j MPS  is equivalent to the traditional nominal rate of protection (NRP). 
 
Following the terminology of Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988), we define the “direct effect” 
that is induced by sector-specific policies as the %MPSBj
B calculated using the actual nominal 
exchange rate e:  
()



















The direct effect measures the proportionate excess of the domestic price from the adjusted 
reference price evaluated at the actual exchange rate. Similarly, the “total effect” that is induced 
by both sectoral and exchange rate policies is defined as the % j MPS  calculated using the 
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The difference between the total and direct effect captures the “indirect effect” of misalignment 
of the exchange rate: 
Indirect Effect % ( ) % ( ) jj MPS e MPS e
∗ =−  
It is evident that the magnitude of the indirect effect is determined by the wedge between 
%( ) j MPS e
∗  and %( ) j MPS e  caused by the exchange rate misalignment. When the exchange rate 
is overvalued, the indirect effect is negative; when the exchange rate is undervalued, the indirect 
effect is positive; and when there is no exchange rate misalignment, the indirect effect is zero 
(Cheng, 2005).  
                                                 
TP
9
PT In all the calculations, we assume that there is no exchange rate pass-through so that the domestic prices are fixed.  
See Cheng (2005) for a relaxation of this assumption. India 
For India, the calculations are undertaken for 11 commodities including wheat, rice, corn, 
sorghum, sugar, groundnut, rapeseed, soybeans, and sunflower, chickpeas, and cotton. Following 
Mullen, Orden and Gulati (2005), the % j MPS  for six commodities (wheat, rice corn, sorghum, 
groundnuts and sugar) are calculated using the Byerlee and Morris (1993) procedure in 
determining the reference prices (see footnote 7), while rapeseed, soybeans, sunflower, 
chickpeas and cotton are assumed to be importable for all years. Table 7 shows the direct, 
indirect and total effects measured by % j MPS  for India for the period 1985-2002.  
 
The sample period 1985-2002 is divided into four distinct subperiods for the presentation of our 
results. Period one (I) represents the sustained overvaluation period from 1985 to 1989. Period 
two (II) is the crisis period from 1990 to 1992 when the exchange rate was overvalued but under 
active adjustment. Period three (III) covers the slight undervaluation period of 1993-1997. The 
last period (IV) is the stable exchange rate period from 1998-2002 when the actual exchange rate 
is close to the equilibrium rate with a slight overvaluation. Average exchange rate misalignment 
for each period is also presented in Table 7.    
 
The numbers on the direct effect are equivalent to the conventional measures of %MPS or NRP. 
On average, the agricultural protection or disprotection measured by the direct effect has shown 
a counter-cyclical pattern in India. Specifically, the direct effect was generally positive when 
world commodity prices were low during the first period (I). It became almost neutral during the 
crisis years (period II), and turned to disprotection when the world prices strengthened in the 
mid-1990s (period III). The world prices have since then followed a downward trend, and in the 
most recent period (IV) an unweighted average indicates a slight disprotection. These results are 
consistent with Mullen, Orden and Gulati (2005), who report their commodity % j MPS  on an 
annual basis. 
 
The indirect effect caused by exchange rate misalignments has had quite different impacts on 
India’s agriculture in comparison to the direct effect. On average, India’s agricultural sector has 
been indirectly penalized by exchange rate overvaluation in periods I, II and IV, but subsidized 
by exchange rate undervaluation in period III. The averages in Table 7 also show that the effect 
of the exchange rate counteracted the direct effect in periods I, II and III, and reinforced the 
direct effect, on average, in period IV. The indirect effect was greater in the years before and 
during the crisis, when the exchange rate was continuously misaligned. In the post-crisis years, 
as the result of decreased magnitude of exchange rate misalignment following macroeconomic 
restructuring, the indirect effect has dampened down. Noticeably, the indirect effect of the 
exchange rate is smaller in absolute value than the direct effect in periods I and III, indicating the 
dominance of sectoral-specific policies over economy-wide policies (exchange rate in this case). 
The opposite happened in periods II and IV. This result is somewhat different from that of 
Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988 and 1991) in which they found that the economy-wide policies 
such as the exchange rate play a more dominant role across a range of developing countries (not 
including India and China) in an earlier period up to the mid-1980s. 
  15Table 7: Direct, Indirect and Total Effects by %MPSj, India 
 
    1985-1989 (I)    1990-1992 (II)    1993-1997 (III)    1998-2002 (IV) 
           %Misalignment  -8.7
a %Misalignment  -6.9 %Misalignment 4.3    %Misalignment -3.7 
Commodity                              Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Wheat               -0.7 -4.1 -4.8 -18.3 -4.7 -23.0 -20.2 4.4 -15.8 11.7 -1.1 10.6
Rice              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
             
-10.2 -5.8 -16.0 -30.7 -5.0 -35.7 -32.4 3.2 -29.2 -2.3 -3.3 -5.6
Corn 20.4 -7.9 12.5 -0.7 -3.5 -4.2 -5.4 1.7 -3.7 -0.6 -0.8 -1.5
Sorghum 41.5 -4.7 36.8 13.7 -3.3 10.4 9.2 0.9 10.1 15.0 -4.0 10.9
Groundnuts 65.2 -11.8 53.4 14.0 -1.5 12.4 2.7 2.0 4.7 9.2 -3.4 5.8
Sugar 61.8 -12.8 49.0 -3.5 -4.1 -7.6 -4.1 4.1 0.0 24.7 -4.6 20.1
Rapeseed 18.9 -9.0 9.9 23.8 -6.6 17.2 -4.3 3.9 -0.3 -4.8 -3.6 -8.4
Soybeans -1.7 -7.9 -9.7 -8.2 -5.4 -13.6 -20.6 3.1 -17.5 -30.3 -2.7 -33.0
Sunflower 37.5 -11.3 26.1 29.9 -7.8 22.2 -10.3 3.6 -6.7 -19.0 -3.2 -22.2
Chickpeas 3.5 -8.9 -5.4 -8.9 -6.2 -15.1 -31.2 2.9 -28.4 -3.5 -4.2 -7.7
Cotton 19.8 -13.0 6.8 -1.2 -7.3 -8.5 -11.0 4.5 -6.5 -13.0 -4.1 -17.1
Average 
b 23.3 -8.8 14.4 0.9 -5.0 -4.1 -11.6 3.1 -8.5 -1.2 -3.2 -4.4
Note: a. Average of annual percentage misalignment. 
          b. Simple unweighted average. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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For China, we base our evaluation on the PSE analysis by Sun (2003), which is limited to the 
years 1995-2001. The % j MPS  is based on 9 commodities: wheat, rice, corn, sorghum, peanut, 
cotton, rapeseed, soybeans and sugar. Due to data constraints, we do not apply the Byerlee and 
Morris (1993) procedure in China: rice, corn, sorghum and peanut are assumed to be exportable 
and wheat, cotton, soybeans, rapeseed and sugar are assumed to be importable. For presentation 
of the results, the sample period is divided in the two subperiods (I and II), representing, 
respectively, periods of slight currency overvaluation (1995-1998) and more intense 
undervaluation (1999-2001). Table 8 shows the direct, indirect and total effect by commodity-
specific % j MPS  in China. 
 
Table 8: Direct, Indirect and Total Effect by %MPSj, China 
  1995-1998 (I)    1999-2001 (II) 
 %Misalignment  -5.8 
a %Misalignment 15.8 
Commodity Direct  Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Rice -10.0  -0.9  -10.9 1.7 11.4 13.1 
Corn 7.1  -1.0  6.1 5.5 11.7 17.2 
Sorghum -18.1  -0.9 -19.0 -32.6 7.6 -25.0 
Peanut -39.1  -0.8  -39.9 -39.2 6.7 -32.5 
Wheat 3.8  -1.4  2.4 -18.2 9.0 -9.2 
Cotton -7.6  -1.2  -8.8 -28.0 8.1 -19.9 
Soybeans 18.9  -1.5 17.4 15.5 12.7 28.2 
Rapeseed 11.5  -1.5 10.0 2.8 11.2 14.0 
Sugar 31.0  -1.7  29.3 15.1 12.8 27.9 
Average 
b -0.3 -1.2  -1.5 -8.6 10.1 1.5 
Note: a. Average of annual percentage misalignment. 
          b. Simple unweighted average. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Except for rice, the direct effect of price interventions measured by % j MPS  has shown 
decreased protection or increase disprotection on the representative commodities in 1999-2001 
compared to 1995-1998. The commodity-specific results are similar to those reported in Sun 
(2003) and Mullen, et al. (2004).
10 The unweighted average disprotection rate increased from -
0.3 in period I to -8.6 in period II.
11 As demonstrated for India, exchange rate misalignment in 
China has either indirectly taxed or subsidized the agricultural sector. The indirect effect of 
exchange rate overvaluation is relatively small and averages about -1.2 percent in period I. 
However, the exchange rate undervaluation in period II has had a much greater impact on the 
agricultural sector. It indirectly subsidized agricultural prices by 10.3 percent, on average, 
counteracting the direct effect and resulting in a positive total effect of 1.5 percent.  
 
                                                 
10 Mullen, et al. (2004) report the results only for five commodities (wheat, soybeans, sugar, rice and corn).  
11 In a longer term context, there appears to be a move toward lessened disprotection of agriculture in China (see 
Mullen et al. (2004) and Cheng and Sun (1998).   18
UEffects on Commodity-Specific PSE 
The calculation of commodity-specific PSE requires that budgetary payments be allocated across 
commodities to determine the budgetary support for a given product, BPBj
B, where “j” denotes a 
specific commodity. Once budgetary payments are allocated among commodities, the product-
specific PSEBj
B is the sum of the MPSBj
B and BPBj
B. Similar to the MPSBj
B, the PSEBj
B measures can be 
expressed on a percentage basis. Following Mullen, et al. (2004), we define a measure of %PSEBj
B 
(using a “trade economist’s denominator”) that expresses support received by farmers as a 













           : value of production of commodity j at adjusted reference price
ar ar
j jj VOP P Q =×
 
Corresponding, the direct, total and indirect effects are given as: 
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Indirect Effect % ( ) % ( )
ar ar
jj PSE e PSE e
∗ =−  
 
It can be seen from the above definitions that the direct, total and indirect effects measured by 
%
ar
j PSE  are different from those measured by %MPSBj
B. When the budgetary payment is positive, 
the direct and total effects of %
ar
j PSE  indicate more protection (or less disprotection). However, 
the impact of inclusion of budgetary payment on the indirect effect depends on the direction of 
exchange rate misalignment. As for the indirect %MPS effect itself, if the exchange rate is 
overvalued, the indirect effect is negative (i.e. shows less protection or more disprotection). If the 
exchange rate is undervalued, the indirect effects is positive (shows more protection or less 
disprotection). See Cheng (2005) for details. 
  
India 
Using the same commodity set and sample periods as in the %MPSBj
B, Table 9 presents the direct, 
indirect and total effects by commodity specific %
ar
j PSE  for India. On average, the direct effect 
on representative commodities exhibits the same counter-cyclical pattern as found in %MPSBj
B: 
support to agriculture drops from a relatively high level in period I to near neutrality in period 
III, and then rose in period IV. However, the direct effect measured by the %
ar
j PSE  indicates 
more agricultural protection than the %MPSBj
B, due to the inclusion of positive budgetary 
payments in the calculation. As the budgetary payments in India become more important in the 
aggregate support to farmers, their impacts on the measured support levels increase. For instance, 
the difference between the unweighted average direct effect measured by %
ar
j PSE  and %MPSBj
B 
during period IV is more than 17 percent.   Table 9: Direct, Indirect and Total Effect by %
ar
j PSE , India 
 
    1985-1989 (I)    1990-1992 (II)    1993-1997 (III)    1998-2002 (IV) 
           %Misalignment  -8.7
a %Misalignment  -6.9 %Misalignment 4.3    %Misalignment -3.7 
Commodity                              Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Wheat                      15.6 -4.7 10.9 5.6 -6.1 -0.5 3.4 5.7 9.1 45.0 -1.5 43.5
Rice     
         
              
              
         
              
              
              
              
                     
             
  -1.7  -6.5 -8.1 -20.1 -5.7  -25.9 -21.0  3.7  -17.3 15.9 -4.2 13.7
Corn   27.5  -8.5 19.1 7.7 -3.9 3.8 4.2  1.9 6.1 11.6 -0.9 10.6
Sorghum 45.7 -4.8 40.9 20.7 -3.5 17.2 18.3 0.9 19.2 27.9 -4.3 23.5
Groundnuts 69.8 -12.2 57.7 18.4 -1.6 16.8 8.8 2.2 11.0 20.0 -3.7 16.4
Sugar   71.8  -13.6 58.2 4.5 -4.4 0.1 5.3  4.5 9.8 37.4 -5.1 32.4
Rapeseed 30.0 -9.9 20.1 35.9 -7.3 28.5 8.0 4.4 12.4 16.8 -4.4 12.4
Soybeans 6.4 -8.6 -2.2 -3.2 -5.7 -8.8 -17.2 3.2 -14.0 -25.2 -2.9 -28.1
Sunflower 46.5 -12.2 35.3 35.5 -8.1 27.4 -4.0 3.8 -0.2 -6.1 -3.6 -9.7
Chickpeas 8.2 -9.3 -1.1 -1.1 -6.7 -7.8 -23.6 3.2 -20.4 8.4 -4.7 3.6
Cotton 58.0 -17.9 40.1 30.6 -10.0 20.6 16.7 7.3 24.0 27.1 -6.2 20.9
Average 
b 34.3 -9.8 24.6 12.2 -5.7 6.5 -  0.1 3.7 3.6 16.3 -3.8 12.6
Note: a. Average of annual percentage misalignment. 
          b. Simple unweighted average. 
Source: Author’s calculation The inclusion of budgetary payment in %
ar
j PSE  has also made the effect of exchange rate 
misalignment larger for each commodity in each period than for the %MPSj. The indirect effect 
shows more disprotection during periods of overvaluation (I, II and IV), and more protection 
during period of undervaluation (III).  In each period, the indirect effect of exchange rate 
misalignment again counteracts the direct effect. Specifically, exchange rate overvaluation has 
indirectly taxed agriculture in periods I, II and IV, but undervaluation has subsidized agriculture 
in period III. The indirect effect is, on average, less than the direct effect in absolute values, 
reflecting again the more dominant role of sectoral policies (except period III).  
 
China 
Table 10 shows the direct, indirect and total effects measured by commodity-specific %
ar
j PSE  in 
China. It is important to note that there have been little explicit policy instruments for direct 
payments or subsidies to farmers in China (Sun, 2003). Instead, there have been various taxes 
and fees by the local and central governments targeted at specific agricultural commodities. 
Following Sun (2003), these taxes and fees were treated as negative payments to farmers.
12 
Nonetheless, the budgetary payments including the taxes and fees represent only a small 
proportion of aggregate support to the farmers. When allocated to each representative 
commodity according to its share in the total value of production, they are less than 10 percent of 
the price support (MPS) in most cases (Sun, 2003). 
 
Table 10: Direct, Indirect and Total Effect by %
ar
j PSE , China 
  1995-1998 (I)    1999-2001 (II) 
 %Misalignment  -5.8 
a %Misalignment 15.8 
Commodity Direct  Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Rice -9.9  -0.9 -10.8   2.5 11.4 13.9 
Corn 7.2  -1.1 6.1 6.8 11.7 18.5 
Sorghum -18.2 -0.8 -19.0 -31.7 7.5 -24.2 
Peanut -39.0  -0.8 -39.8 -38.5 6.8 -31.7 
Wheat 3.8  -1.3 2.5 -17.2 9.0 -8.2 
Cotton -7.5  -1.2 -8.7 -27.2 8.2 -19.0 
Soybeans 19.1 -1.6 17.5 16.9 12.7 29.6 
Rapeseed 11.6 -1.4 10.2 4.0 11.3 15.3 
Sugar 31.0  -1.7 29.3   15.2 12.8 28.0 
Average 
b -0.2 -1.2 -1.4 -7.7 10.2 2.5 
Note: a. Average of annual percentage misalignment. 
          b. Simple unweighted average. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Because of the dominance of the MPS component in the aggregate support, the inclusion of 
small budgetary payments in the calculation of %
ar
j PSE  has had little impact on the direct, total 
                                                 
12 Starting in 2000, China launched its pilot reforms on rural tax and fee system, and one of the reforms is to lower, 
exempt or abolish the taxes on the farmers (Sun, 2003). However, these reform measures were still in their 
experimental stages during 2000-2001 and their impacts were little on this analysis.  
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and indirect effects in China. Similar to the %MPSBj
B, the direct effect of agricultural policies on 
unweighted average has disprotected the farmers of these covered commodities for the whole 
period and the rate of disprotection increased from -0.2 in 1995-1998 to -7.7 in 1999-2002. The 
indirect effect of exchange rate misalignment has amplified the direct effect in the first period 
but counteracted the direct effect in the second period. The indirect effect is more pronounced in 
the second period due to greater exchange rate undervaluation, which indirectly subsidized the 
agricultural sector by 10.2 percent. Furthermore, the small budgetary payments (or taxes) have 
also made the change of indirect effect over time primarily determined by the degree of China’s 
exchange rate misalignment. 
 
UEffects on Total PSE 
The total PSE expressed in nominal terms for all agricultural producers is the sum of total MPS 
and aggregate budgetary payments. The calculation of total MPS, according to the OECD 
approach consists of three steps. First, a nominal value of MPS is estimated for individual 
products, the set of which is known as the covered “MPS commodities.” The second step is to 
sum the product-specific MPS results into an MPSBc
B for the covered commodities. In the third 
step the MPSBc
B for covered commodities is “scaled up” to all products based on the share (k) of 
the covered commodities in the total value of agricultural production. The final step or “MPS 
extrapolation procedure” can be expressed as MPS = MPSBc
B/k, where MPS is the estimated total 
market price support. With the scaling-up, the OECD “Total PSE” is calculated as PSE = MPS + 
BP. Without the scaling-up the total PSE is PSEBc
B = MPSBc
B + BP. Similar to commodity-specific 
PSEs, total PSE measures can be expressed on a percentage basis (denoted by %PSE) using 
(VOP + BP) or VOPP
ar
P as the denominator, where VOP and VOPP
ar
P are the total value of 
agricultural production at domestic producer prices and world reference prices, respectively, and 
BP is the total budgetary payments. In the following analysis, the total %PSE is calculated using 
the OECD denominator (VOP+BP) as commonly reported.  
 
Again, we define the direct, total and indirect effect in terms of %PSE. The three effects in the 
non-scaled-up case can be adapted from the %PSEBj
B by replacing the MPSBj
B and () jj VOP BP +  
with MPSBc
B and () VOP BP + . With scaling-up, the effects are given as: 
() /
Direct Effect % ( ) 100
c MPS e k BP
PSE e
VOP BP
+ ⎡⎤ == × ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
  
() /
Total Effect % ( ) 100





== × ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
  
() ( ) 1
Indirect Effect % ( ) % ( ) 100
cc MPS e MPS e
PSE e PSE e
kV O P B P
∗
∗ ⎡⎤ −
=− = × ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
  
 
It is evident that the direct, indirect and total effects in the scaled-up version are different from 
those in the non-scaled-up version. The impact of scaling-up on the support level (direct and total 
effects) depends on the sign of MPS: if MPS is negative, then the scaling-up will indicate more 
disprotection and if MPS is positive, the scaling-up will indicate more protection. The scaling-up 
can lead to different degrees of change in the direct and total effects depending on the relative 
magnitude of MPS and BP. However, the scaling-up magnifies the indirect effect by exactly 1/k , the inverse of the share of covered commodities in the total value of agricultural 
production.    
 
India 
Table 11 shows the three effects in India without and with scaling-up. The covered commodities 
are the same as those used in the previous calculations. In general, the support to agriculture 
(direct and total effect), scaled-up or non-scaled-up, indicates a similar counter-cyclical pattern, 
rising when world prices are low (as in periods I and IV) and falling when world prices 
strengthen (as in period II and III).
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Table 11: Direct, Indirect and Total Effect by %PSE, India 
 Non-scaling-up  (%PSEc)   Scaling-up  (%PSE) 
 Direct  Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
1985-1989 (I)  6.8  -3.0 3.8 9.7 -6.4 3.3 
1990-1992 (II)  -0.9  -3.3 -4.1 -9.4 -7.0 -16.4 
1993-1997 (III)  -4.4  2.1 -2.3 -19.5 5.0 -14.5 
1998-2002 (IV)  8.2  -1.1 7.1 8.8 -2.5 6.3 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
In period I and IV, the MPSc component of the PSE is relatively small with the same sign as the 
budgetary payment, and the scaling-up does not have a significant impact on support levels 
indicated by direct and total effects. In contrast, when the MPSc is more important and of similar 
magnitude but opposite signs as the budgetary payment in period II and III, the scaled-up direct 
and total effects are several times larger than the non-scaled-up ones. The direct effect decreased 
more than 10 times from -0.9 to -9.4 in period II. The change in the direct effect is smaller in 
period III, dropping from -4.4 to -19.5. The scaling-up also causes the total effect to decrease 
from -4.1 to -16.4 in period II, and from -2.3 to -14.5 in period III. The impact of scaling-up on 
the direct and total effects in India also depends on the sign of MPS. In terms of the direct effect, 
where the MPS is evaluated at the actual exchange rate, the scaling-up has led to higher 
protection rates in periods I and IV when the MPS is positive, but higher disprotection rates in 
periods II and III when the MPS is negative. The results are different for the total effect since the 
MPS in this case is evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate.    
 
The scaled-up and non-scaled-up indirect effects show different impact of exchange rate 
misalignment on India’s agriculture during different periods. The exchange rate effects are 
consistent with the previous commodity-specific analysis: when the exchange rate was 
overvalued (periods I, II and IV), the indirect effect works against the agricultural sector. The 
opposite happens when the exchange rate was undervalued in period III. The scaling-up has had 
a uniform impact on the indirect effect for each period, which more than doubles in the scaled-up 
than the non-scaled-up case. The reason for this is that the share of covered commodities in total 
value of production is about 0.45 for each of the periods.  
 
 
                                                 
13 Again, the results are very similar to those reported by Mullen, Orden and Gulati (2005). 
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Table 12 shows the direct, indirect and total effect in China without and with the scaling-up. The 
scaled-up or non-scaled-up direct effect measured by total PSE indicates that China’s support to 
the agriculture has remained negative in each period and level of discrimination against 
agriculture increased over the short time period covered. This result is somewhat different from 
Sun (2003) and Mullen, et al. (2004) who report the annual %PSE based on different sets of 
commodities. The indirect effect of exchange rate shows slight disprotection in period I but 
greater protection in period II.  
 
Table 12: Direct, Indirect and Total Effect by %PSE, China 
 Non-scaling-up  (%PSEc)   Scaling-up  (%PSE) 
 Direct  Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
1995-1997 (I)  -0.4  -0.9 -1.3 -0.8 -1.9 -2.7 
1998-2001 (II)  -0.7  7.0 6.3 -3.0 16.8 13.8 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
In contrast to India, the MPSc (evaluated at the actual exchange rate) in China is a more 
important component of PSE than the budgetary payments for most of the years. In period I 
when the MPSc is significantly larger than the budgetary payment, the impact of scaling-up on 
the direct effect is small (twice as large in the scaled-up relative to the non-scaled-up version). In 
period II, the decrease in the magnitude of MPSc raises the impacts of scaling-up on the direct 
effect to more than 4 times. 
 
Since the MPSc evaluated at the actual exchange rate is negative on average in each period, the 
scaling-up has uniformly led to more disprotection indicated by the direct effect. However, when 
the MPSc becomes positive when calculated using the equilibrium exchange rate in period II, the 
total effect with scaling-up indicates more protection than that without scaling-up. Similar to 
India, the scaling-up in China has had a uniform impact on the indirect effect, which is about 
twice as large as the non-scaled-up counterpart. This again corresponds to the fact that the share 
of covered commodities in total value of production averages about 0.5 in the two periods. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
The level of the exchange rate and its disequilibrium can have significant impacts on the 
agricultural sector. Although there are repeated claims and indeed widespread agreement that 
exchange rate misalignments can lead to inaccurate calculations of the support measures, 
empirical studies on the issue have been scant and mainly focused on the effects of exchanges 
rate on the nominal rate of protection (NRP). There have been attempts to consider the role the 
exchange rate plays in more comprehensive agricultural policy indicators such as the PSEs, but 
the calculations usually use simple adjustment approaches based on effective or PPP exchange 
rates. In this analysis, we propose an alternative approach to determining equilibrium exchange 
rates and apply the measures in evaluating the MPS and the PSE. 
 
Nominal equilibrium exchange rates corresponding to estimated real equilibrium rates are 
applied to the MPS and the PSE calculations in the two countries based on earlier analyses by 
Mullen, Orden and Gulati (2005) and Sun (2003). Our results indicate that the indirect effect of 
  23exchange rate overvaluation has potentially taxed the agricultural sector in India during the 
period of 1985-1992 and 1998-2002. However, the magnitude of these indirect effects is smaller 
in the later periods when the actual exchange rate moves closer to its equilibrium value. The 
indirect effect of exchange rate misalignment is, in general, smaller than the direct effect from 
sectoral-specific policies. For China, the indirect effect of exchange rate undervaluation in the 
period of 1999-2001 has had a much greater impact on the measured support level than 
overvaluation in 1995-1998. It has more than offset the disprotection to the agriculture and led to 
positive a total effect. 
 
The relative importance of different PSE components also affects the estimates of the direct, 
indirect and total effects. First, the inclusion of budgetary payments in the analysis changes the 
effects of agricultural and exchange rate policies measured by the MPS. Commodity-specific 
PSEs show that such changes are more pronounced in India where the budgetary payments have 
become a more important component of the PSE. The direct and total effects by the commodity-
specific PSEs indicate more protection and less disprotection. But the impact of including 
budgetary payment on the indirect effect can be different depending on the direction of exchange 
rate misalignment: more disprotection when the exchange rate is overvalued and more protection 
when the exchange rate is undervalued. In contrast to India, China has had little explicit 
budgetary payments to farmers and the effects measured by the PSE do not differ much from 
those measured by the MPS.  
 
Second, the scaling-up procedure has had important impacts on the different effects measured by 
the total PSE. In India, the scaling-up leads to more significant changes in the direct and total 
effects during periods when the MPS becomes larger in magnitude than the budgetary payments. 
In contrast, changes in the direct and total effects in China are similar across periods since the 
MPS plays a more dominant role in the total PSE in most of the years. The effect of scaling-up 
on support levels depends on the sign of MPS: if MPS is negative, then scaling-up leads to more 
disprotection and if MPS is positive, the scaling-up leads to more protection. In addition, the 
impact of scaling-up on the indirect effect is directly related to the share of covered commodities 
in the total value of agricultural production. In India and China, the scaling-up leads to greater 
indirect effects which double the non-scaled-up counterparts.    
 
In general, the estimation results are consistent with previous studies. However, the results in this 
study are highly dependent on the modeling strategy of equilibrium exchange rates. Alternative 
models of equilibrium exchange rates exist and it would be ideal to conduct a sensitivity analysis 
of the PSE where results from different approaches to equilibrium exchange rates are compared. 
In addition, the above measures of different effects assume that the domestic price of the relevant 
commodity remains unchanged even though the exchange rates have been changed. In other 
words, this study, like many others assessing exchange rate effects on the NPR, ignores the 
“pass-through” of exchange rates on domestic prices. Recent research efforts have been directed 
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